My research centres on the normativity of belief: how belief should be assessed once truth, practical life, and evaluative considerations are no longer assumed to align.
I approach this problem through contemporary epistemology, Nietzsche studies, and the philosophy of nihilism.
My recent work examines pragmatism about belief, Nietzsche’s critique of the unconditional value of truth, and nihilism as a problem concerning the governance of belief-like attitudes.
Research interests
Normativity of belief · Pragmatism about belief · Nietzsche · Nihilism · Agency and value
Selected work
(forthcoming) “Truth Against Life? Rational Belief Between Pragmatism Nietzsche and Nihilism” [MA thesis]
2023. “The Superhuman as a Doctrine of Classical Nihilism: An Analysis of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Niezsche in ‘European Nihilism’” [BA thesis]
2025. “The Lottery Paradox as a pseudoproblem potentially explained on psycho-linguistic grounds” [term paper]
2025. “Are postmodern philosophies methodologically invalid? An assessment of Habermas’ argument“ [term paper]
2025. “The Dyonisius-Rezeption as a Fertile Fallacy Caused by a Paradox Inherent within Medieval Epistemology” [term paper]